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Are Secondary Considerations Still “Secondary”?:

An Examination of Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness Five Years After KSR
by John Paul Putney1

1

Judge Learned Hand was among the first
stout advocates of secondary considerations2—also
known as objective indicia of nonobviousness—as
a necessary safeguard against inherent hindsight
bias in determining nonobviousness3 as part of a
necessarily after-the-fact inquiry. The Supreme
1. J.D. Candidate (2014), University of Pittsburgh School of
Law; M.P.I.A. Candidate (2014), University of Pittsburgh Graduate
School of Public and International Affairs; M.M., New England
Conservatory of Music; B.A., Chapman University; B.M. Chapman
University.
2. Learned Hand referred to secondary considerations as the
“history of the art”:
[T]he most reliable test is to look at the
situation before and after it appears . . . . Courts,
made up of laymen as they must be, are likely
either to underrate, or to overrate, the difficulties
in making new and profitable discoveries in fields
with which they cannot be familiar; and, so far as it
is available, they had best appraise the originality
involved by the circumstances which preceded,
attended and succeeded the appearance of the
invention. . . . We have repeatedly declared that
in our judgment this approach is more reliable then
prior conclusions drawn from vaporous, and almost
inevitably self-dependent, general propositions.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d
937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946); see also, e.g., Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d
501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224
F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128
F.2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1942); Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch
Textile Mach., 87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1937); Ruben Condenser
Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1935). Judge Hand’s
strong praise for secondary considerations was animated in part by his
contempt for other tests:
When [secondary considerations are] not at
hand, we are forced to fabricate a standard as best
we can from our naive ignorance; but that is so
unsatisfactory an expedient that resort to it should
be as sparing as possible. In either case, whether
we have evidence, or must grope unguided, those
putatively objective principles by which it is so
often supposed that invention can be detected
are illusion, and the product of unconscious
equivocation; the inexorable syllogism which
appears to compel the conclusion is a sham.
B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935).
3. The nonobvious requirement was codified by Congress in
1952. 35 U.S.C. § 103. The obviousness inquiry supplanted the
imprecise common law “invention” inquiry. See Graham v. John Deer
Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).

Court confirmed the inferential value of secondary
considerations in Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kansas City,4 agreeing with Learned Hand that such
considerations are “more susceptible [to] judicial
treatment than are the highly technical facts often
present in patent litigation.”5 Over forty years later,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the test laid out in
Graham (including secondary considerations) in
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,6 leading some
observers to speculate that secondary considerations
would become a more important inquiry in patent
litigation.7
Five years after KSR, however, it appears
courts are still unclear on how much weight to
give secondary considerations as part of the overall
obviousness determination, though the Federal
Circuit is insistent that objective indicia must be
considered if present. At times, the Federal Circuit
has viewed secondary considerations as “secondary”
in probative value and has been quick to discount
evidence of objective indicia as insufficient to tip
the scales of nonobviousness. Other Federal Circuit
4. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
5. Id. at 35-36. The Court specifically mentions “commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.” leaving
room for additional considerations. Id.
6. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic
Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
989, 1004-07 (2008) (“As the legal rules that fight hindsight bias, such
as the TSM test, are trimmed back . . . patentees will want to rely more
on . . . secondary considerations . . . .”); Amanda Wieker, Secondary
Considerations Should Be Given Increased Weight in Obviousness
Inquiries Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the Post-KSR v. Teleflex World,
17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 665, 681-83 (2008) (suggesting reasoned decisions
based on explicit secondary considerations can avert “obviousness
opinions based entirely on . . . vague and imprecise notions of
common sense and creativity . . . .”); Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary
Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective
Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2070, 2090-102
(2011) (examining the effect of KSR on subsequent Federal Circuit
decisions through early 2010 that involved secondary considerations);
Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness:
An Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20
Fed. Cir. B.J. 369, 378-81 (2011) (suggesting that KSR made finding
an invention obvious easier for patent challengers). But see Eli M.
Sheets, Arguing Secondary Considerations After KSR: Proceed with
Caution, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 1, 16-22 (2011-2012) (suggesting secondary
considerations have been relegated to “lame-duck” status following
KSR).
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panels have esteemed secondary considerations
as the “most probative and cogent evidence in the
record.”8 As the Federal Circuit wrestles internally
with the probative value of objective indicia,
practitioners are aware that courts tend to recite
and rely on secondary considerations when finding
patents nonobvious, but marginalize or disparage
them when finding patents obvious and invalid.9
Part I of this article reviews the genesis of
the nonobviousness requirement by examining its
predecessor, the landmark Supreme Court cases
interpreting the requirement, and the procedural
rules that have shaped the nonobviousness
inquiry. Juxtaposed against the development of
the inquiry are the shifts in the role of secondary
considerations up until KSR.
Part II of this article reviews the Federal
Circuit’s treatment of secondary considerations
in the five intervening years since the Supreme
Court’s decision in KSR and finds that secondary
considerations are still often treated as secondary
in stature, but with some recent indications of
forthcoming change. It next turns attention to the
nexus requirement as a flashpoint of interpretive
conflict. Looking closely at the established
scheme of burden shifting in the nexus inquiry,
this article examines the inconsistencies in the
application of the rules governing the shifting
burdens in post-KSR Federal Circuit case law. In
addition, the article notes the opaque distinctions
between the nexus tests that serve to obfuscate the
nexus inquiry and undermine the probative value
of secondary considerations.
Part III of this article concludes by noting
a persistent divide on the nexus test and lingering
disagreement over the value of secondary
considerations in the face of Supreme Court
silence on the topic.
I.
Secondary Considerations and the 		
	Nonobviousness Requirement
	A.	The Precursor to the 		
		Nonobviousness Requirement
Patents are intended “to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by
incentivizing innovation through short-term
8. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
9. See 2-5 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 5.05,
5-894 (Matthew Bender ed., 2012).
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“exclusive rights” (i.e., a qualified statutory
monopoly),10 thereby affording the inventor
a commercial benefit. In 1850, however, the
Supreme Court clarified that not every creation
would qualify as a patentable invention.11 Rather,
“[a] degree of skill and ingenuity [ ] constitute
essential elements of every invention.”12 Hence,
where either element is lacking, a patent is
invalid. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,13 the Supreme
Court affirmed an invalidity finding because the
substitution of clay or porcelain knobs for more
common door knob materials did not require
“more ingenuity and skill . . . than were possessed
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business.”14 Although the inquiry was phrased in
terms of “invention” and “inventor,” Hotchkiss
is the genesis of the concept of nonobviousness,
which Congress codified as part of the Patent
Act of 1952,15 unifying and supplanting the more
nebulous “invention” standard.16
B.
		

Secondary Considerations Prior
to § 103

Secondary considerations, too, predate the
Congressional codification of the nonobviousness
requirement. In Smith v. Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co.,17 while considering the validity of
a patent for artificial teeth sets cast in vulcanized
rubber, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[m]
ore was needed for [the invention] than simply
mechanical judgment and good taste. Were it
not so, hard rubber would doubtless[ly] have
been used in the construction of artificial sets
of teeth, gums, and plates long before [the
inventor] applied for his patent.”18 Moreover,
the Court noted “eminent dentists and experts
. . . uniformly speak of [the invention] as [new
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850).
12. Id.
13. 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
14. Id. at 267.
15. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792
(1952). The nonobviousness requirement—codified at 35 U.S.C. §
103—provides: “A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the subject matter [of the patent] and the prior art are such
that the subject matter . . . would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art . . .
.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
16. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 14
(1966).
17. 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
18. Id. at 494-95.
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and most valuable]”19 and as having created
a “revolution in dental practice, [with] many
thousands of operators . . . using it in preference
to older devices.”20 Notwithstanding Hotchkiss’
holding that substitution was not “invention,”21
this combination of long-felt need, commercial
success, and industry praise sufficed to “justify the
inference that what [the patentee] accomplished
was . . . invention.”22
Courts, however, gave secondary
considerations widely varied treatment.23 In the
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand criticized
the “misty” nonobviousness requirement as
inviting judges “to substitute our ignorance
for [] acquaintance with the subject of those
who [are] familiar with it.”24 Nonetheless, he
highlighted “sign posts” like long-felt need, failure
of others, and commercial success that could
guide the inquiry.25 Conversely, other courts
quickly disposed of secondary considerations as
“a relevant consideration” “in a close case,” but
incapable of validating patents for “device[s]
lack[ing] invention.”26
C.
Interpreting § 103’s 			
		Nonobviousness Command: the
		
Graham Analysis
Enacted in 1952, the nonobviousness
requirement, as embodied in § 103,27 was intended
to have a “stabilizing effect and minimize great
departures which have appeared in some cases.”28
In the seminal Supreme Court case on the thennewly-minted nonobvious requirement, Graham
19. Id. at 495.
20. Id.
21. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 253 (1850).
22. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495
(1876).
23. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study
of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 33-43 (2007) (tracing
evolution of the standard of invention); Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 817-18 (1988) (outlining
divergent standards vis-à-vis evidence of commercial success prior
to § 103); see generally Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent
Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 629-30 (4th ed. 2007).
24. Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960).
25. Id.
26. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply
Co., 332 F.2d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 1964).
27. The nonobviousness requirement, codified in 35 U.S.C. §
103, was created by the Patent Act of 1952. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66
Stat. 792 (1952).
28. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 15
(1966) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394).

v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,29 the Court laid
out a deceptively simple inquiry including three
primary considerations: (1) the scope and content
of the prior art; (2) differences between the prior
art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art.30 The three
primary considerations echo the language of §
103.31
In addition, the Court cautiously
endorsed secondary considerations that “might
be utilized” and “may have relevancy” as indicia
of nonobviousness.32 Describing the judiciary as
“most ill-fitted to . . . the technological duties [of]
patent litigation,”33 the Court agreed with Judge
Learned Hand that objective indicia are “more
susceptible [to] judicial treatment.”34 As a “guard
against . . . hindsight,” secondary considerations
serve to “resist the temptation to read into the
prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.”35
Despite this lofty proclamation, the Court pithily
concluded that the objective indicia in the case
at issue were insufficient to “tip the scales of
patentability.”36 The conflicting assessments of
secondary considerations in Graham failed to
definitively settle the question of their evidentiary
value, especially as compared to the first three
factors of the four-part Graham analysis.
D.
		

Shaping the Graham Analysis
with the TSM Test

In the decades leading up to KSR, the
Federal Circuit developed a strict standard—the
Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation (TSM) test37—
which it applied “rigorously” to “[guard] against
hindsight-based obviousness analysis.”38 The
TSM test required a “clear and particular,” if not
29. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
30. Id. at 16.
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
32. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
33. Id. at 36 (citing Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v.
United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60 (1943)).
34. Id. at 35-36.
35. Id. at 36.
36. Id.
37. The TSM test originated in the Federal Circuit’s
predecessor, the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, see In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961),
but was developed further by the Federal Circuit in the decades
leading up to KSR. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir.
1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
38. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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“express,” teaching, suggestion or motivation
to combine two (or more) references to produce
the subject of the patent being challenged.39
Although not intended to supplant the Graham
analysis, the TSM test became a dominant method
for defining what would have been “obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art”—i.e., the first
three of the four Graham factors.40 Successful
patent challengers who satisfied the TSM test
established a “prima facie” case of obviousness,
after which courts turned to the fourth Graham
factor—secondary considerations—to “rebut” the
prima facie obviousness case.41 While the TSM
test gave shape to the primary considerations
under the Graham analysis, it did not address the
probative value of secondary considerations. It
did, however, separate objective indicia from the
first three factors of the Graham analysis, inviting
courts to treat them as conceptually distinct even
where such distinction could be seen as logically
suspect.42
E.
		
		

secondary considerations can simply “not be
compelling enough”45 even in “a close [case].”46
Other panels found that “extensive secondary
considerations” may rebut obviousness, at least
where the court seems unconvinced a prima facie
case exists.47
As an additional hurdle to establishing
nonobviousness, the Federal Circuit has also
imposed a “nexus” requirement that requires
parties to connect the evidence of objective
indicia (e.g., commercial success) to the merits of
the patented subject matter, as opposed to other
factors (e.g., a ritzy advertising campaign). This
requirement, which was also advocated by Judge
Learned Hand,48 can prove onerous for patent
holders to satisfy.49

Defining the Evidentiary Value
of Objective Indicia After 		
Graham

Objective indicia were mostly considered
individually after Graham (i.e., each individual
secondary consideration was considered
separately).43 Their relative weight, however,
remained unclear.44 Far from having binding
effect, several Federal Circuit panels found that
39. While the references need not expressly teach that the
disclosure contained therein should be combined with another, the
showing of combinability must be “clear and particular.” In re
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999; see also Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
40. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
41. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d
1369, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
42. See generally discussion infra Part I.F.
43. Courts have considered numerous objective indicia:
long-felt need, failure of others, success by others, commercial
success, commercial failure, commercial acquiescence (licensing),
professional approval, industry skepticism, teaching away,
unexpected results, copying, laudatory statements by the infringer,
difficulty/ease of PTO process, near-simultaneous invention. See
generally Chisum, supra note 9, § 5.05.
44. The Ecolochem court noted that Graham named only
three secondary considerations (commercial success, long-felt
need, failure—or lack thereof—of others) and proceeded to give
the “most weight” “in the instant case” to the three named indicia,
even though additional widely-recognized indicia were also present:
copying, teaching away, and simultaneous invention. Ecolochem v.
S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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45. Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d
953, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
46. Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1381.
47. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d
1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
48. See Textile Mach. Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile Mach.,
87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1937) (“[Objective indicia are] the best
test when . . . available. But it is a dangerous test to apply, and will
lead one astray unless jealously watched.”), aff’d, 302 U.S. 490
(1938).
49. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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F.
		

KSR and the Rebuke of the 		
Federal Circuit

In the lead up to KSR, the TSM test drew
ample criticism from observers who linked an
overly strict application of the test to a decline
in the standard of patentability.50 Affirming
the continued relevancy of the Graham factors
(including secondary considerations “where
appropriate”), in KSR International v. Teleflex
Inc.,51 the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the rigid
[TSM] approach” which failed to allow for
“common sense.”52 As for objective indicia,
the Court, much as it did in Graham, pithily
concluded: “[The patentee] has not shown . . . any
secondary factors to dislodge the [obviousness]
determination . . . .”53 Quickly disposing of the
objective indicia, the Court again passed on the
opportunity to provide instruction on how much
weight to afford objective indicia.
Shortness of shrift, however, did not deter
some commentators from predicting a rise in the
importance of secondary considerations in the
obviousness inquiry for patentees.54 Indeed, many
commentators agreed that KSR made obviousness
easier to establish by lowering the threshold to
establish a prima facie case of obviousness.55
50. See, e.g., National Research Council of the National
Academy, A Patent System for the 21st Century 87-94 (Stephen
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004)
(asserting the law of obviousness needs to change); Federal Trade
Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competitions and Patent Law and Policy 8-15 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ innovationrpt.pdf (noting numerous
commentators critical of the law of obviousness); Katherine J.
Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview
and an Application to the “Patent Explosion,” 21 Berkeley Tech.
L. J. 1293, 1329–38 (2006) (attributing a “patent explosion” to
the decline of patentability standards); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual
Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
Wake Forest L. Rev. 827, 833 (1999) (noting lowered obviousness
bar for biotechnology); Robert W. Harris, The Emerging Primacy
of “Secondary Considerations” as Validity Ammunition: Has
the Federal Circuit Gone Too Far?, 71 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc’y 185, 201 (1989) (suggesting a trend towards favoring
patentability). But see Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The
Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of
the Law of Obviousness, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2051 (2007); Gregory N.
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 Ohio St.
L.J. 1391 (2006).
51. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
52. Id. at 415-21.
53. Id. at 426.
54. See sources cited supra note 7.
55. See Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for
Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law
Following KSR, 20 Fed. Cir. B.J. 369, 378-81 (2011) (suggesting

Patentees would naturally become more reliant on
secondary considerations to rebut.
Interestingly, the TSM test persists in the
aftermath of KSR. Noting that only the rigid TSM
test was expressly rejected, the Federal Circuit
has, at times, applied a more flexible version of the
test.56 Moreover, Federal Circuit panels continue
to contextualize the obviousness inquiry in terms
of a prima facie case of obviousness, looking to
secondary considerations only as rebuttal evidence
to an obviousness case. Thus, even without
mentioning the TSM test by name, it continues to
influence the obviousness inquiry.
To the extent the TSM test continues
to reinforce shaping the obviousness inquiry
as a two-pronged test (i.e., prima facie case
of obviousness and secondary considerations
rebuttal), its persistence post-KSR presents two
issues. First, the diverse set of commonly accepted
“secondary considerations” is not analytically
analogous. In other words, while commercial
success is clearly circumstantial evidence
(operating by inference), unexpected results are
much less clearly so because their probative value
derives almost exclusively from the state of the
art at the time of the discovery.57 Nonetheless, the
procedural structure encouraged by the remnant
TSM test relegates both to a distinct rebuttal class.
Second, to the extent objective indicia
reveal, as Learned Hand suggested, the “history
of the art”—i.e., the heart and soul of the Graham
analysis—to separate them out into a distinct
category is artificial and can be problematic,
even if procedurally expedient. Doing so invites
impact of KSR made finding an invention obvious easier for patent
challengers); Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals, Combinations, and
“Common Sense”: How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision
Is Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness Determinations in
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. Ky. L. Rev.
281, 285-86 (2008) (observing that KSR seemingly makes
obviousness easier to establish); Diane Christine Renbarger, Note,
Putting the Brakes on Drugs: The Impact of KSR v. Teleflex on
Pharmaceutical Patenting Strategies, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 905, 908-09
(2008) (suggesting KSR may have heightened the nonobviousness
standard for pharmaceutical inventions).
56. See Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 511 F.3d 1157,
1172 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v.
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)),
supplemented sub nom. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 275
F. App’x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Comaper Corp. v. Antec,
Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Ortho-McNeil
Pharm. Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364-65 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) and Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
57. See Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 775 F.
Supp. 2d 985, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
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courts to make the precise error the Federal
Circuit repeatedly overturns: coming to a decision
about obviousness before meaningfully weighing
secondary considerations.
G.
Failure to Consider Secondary
		Considerations is Reversible
		Error
The qualified language of Graham does not
mandate that courts consider objective indicia.58
Established in 1982,59 and charged with appellate
jurisdiction for virtually all patent claims,60 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified
early on: “evidence rising out of the so-called
‘secondary considerations’ must always when
present be considered en route to a determination
of obviousness . . . .”61 Consistently portraying
the Graham analysis as a four-part test, the
Federal Circuit is hawkish when it comes to lower
courts’ decisions that have ignored secondary
considerations.62 Even where courts explicitly
consider secondary considerations, but do so only
after reaching a “conclusion” on obviousness, they
may be overturned.63 Even if the Graham court’s
“tip the scales” language seemed ambivalent,
the Federal Circuit clarified: “[Secondary
58. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966). The language of Graham is indisputably permissive and
not imperative: “secondary considerations . . . might be utilized . . .
. [They] may have relevancy.” Id.
59. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 vests the Federal Circuit with “exclusive
jurisdiction” over most matters arising under patent law. However,
where the patent claims arise as counterclaims by a defendant,
other Courts of Appeals may adjudicate patent counterclaims. See
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. Inc., 535 U.S.
826, 833-34 (2002).
61. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
62. See, e.g., TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing lower court for the second time
for “summarily dismiss[ing] evidence of secondary considerations”
and ordering reassignment to another judge). However, failure
to cite secondary considerations, alone, may not be reversible
error where they “cannot overcome the strong evidence of
nonobviousness.” See Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 437 F.
App’x 897, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Aug. 1, 2011);

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

63. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release
Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(reversing the district court because it reached a “conclusion”
regarding obviousness before explicitly considering—and
rejecting—the objective indicia evidence proffered by the
patentee), reh’g en banc denied (Jul. 25, 2012) [hereinafter In re
Cyclobenzaprine].
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considerations are] to be considered as part of all
the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker
remains in doubt after reviewing the art.”64 To
ignore such evidence would be “jurisprudentially
inappropriate.”65
Nevertheless, various Federal Circuit
panels have used disparate language in portraying
the role of secondary considerations in the Graham
analysis and, in some cases, seemingly applied
different standards.66 Casting the obviousness
inquiry in terms of a prima facie obviousness
determination—a preliminary status as opposed
to a more settled “conclusion” or “finding”—
requiring a rebuttal of secondary considerations
(likely a remnant of the TSM test, albeit without
mentioning it by name), some cases continue
to weigh the three primary considerations to
determine if the patent challenger has made out a
prima facie case of obviousness before moving on
to consider evidence of objective indicia.67
The Federal Circuit reiterated the
appropriate standard very recently in In re
Cyclobenzaprine, seeking to clarify concededly
“inconsistently articulated” standards vis-àvis secondary considerations that may have
“understandably” confused some.68 The
Cyclobenzaprine court mildly chastised a district
court for reaching an obviousness “finding” prior
to considering secondary considerations, phrasing
the legal error as improperly “shifting the burden
of persuasion to [the patentee].”69 The panel laid
out a litany of cases that expressly directed courts
to “consider all objective evidence before reaching
an obviousness conclusion.”70 Turning then to
cases that phrased the “obviousness analysis in
terms of a ‘prima facie’ case which must then be
‘rebutted’ by the patentee,”71 the court insisted
64. Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538 (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1302-05
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
67. Id. at 1304.
68. In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1075.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1076 (citing Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d
654 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770
F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool
Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Richardson–Vicks
Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Rockwell
Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
71. In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1076 (citing
Innovention Toys, L.L.C. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d
1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Transocean Offshore Deepwater
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that such cases “should not be interpreted as
establishing a formal burden-shifting framework”
for three reasons: (1) the fact that objective indicia
are considered last is not outcome-determinative
in those cases; (2) the “prima facie”/”rebuttal”
courts have generally clarified that fact finders
must consider all evidence before reaching a
determination; and (3) U.S. Supreme Court
precedent does not support such a reading.72
Although the Cyclobenzaprine court
accurately observes that failure to consider
secondary considerations is a reversible error,
there is more to the story. Lurking behind the
concern of improper “burden-shifting” is the
Federal Circuit’s internal struggle to define the
evidentiary value of secondary considerations.
II.

Secondary Considerations in the Wake
of KSR: Conflicting Approaches

	A. 	Weighing the Graham Factors
		
Post-KSR
A careful examination of Federal Circuit
cases following KSR through June 201273 reveals
that, more often than not, secondary considerations
were summarily dismissed as insufficient74 or
undercut through a stringent interpretation of the
nexus requirement.75 Nonetheless, the requirement
to consider objective indicia remains intact. So,
while secondary considerations must be considered
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson
Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports,
Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); WMS Gaming, Inc.
v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

72. In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1077-79.
73. For a complete list of cases reviewed, see Appendix,
available in the online version of this article at www.ipbrief.
net. See also Natalie A. Thomas, Secondary Considerations in
Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of Objective Indicia Following
KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2070 (2011) (examining effect
of KSR on subsequent Federal Circuit decisions through early 2010
that involved secondary considerations).
74. See, e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d
1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A strong case of prima facie

obviousness . . . cannot be overcome by a far weaker
showing of objective indicia of nonobviousness.”); Geo.

M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294,
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding the objective evidence of
nonobviousness would “fail to make a difference” in light of strong
evidence of obviousness).
75. See, e.g., Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA
LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

and occasionally enjoy lavish praise from the
court,76 they rarely, if ever, seem to persuade the
court to go against a prima facie obviousness
determination based on the first three Graham
factors. In practice, courts tend to recite and rely
on secondary considerations when finding patents
nonobvious, but marginalize or disparage them
when finding patents obvious and invalid.77
While the trend suggests secondary
considerations are still “secondary” in probative
value, there are exceptions.78 In May 2012,
the Federal Circuit decided Mintz v. Dietz &
Watson, Inc.79 The opinion included a lengthy
exposition extolling the importance of secondary
considerations in safeguarding against hindsight
bias in after-the-fact inquiries—all en route to
remanding to the district court.80 Likening the
obviousness inquiry to “walk[ing] a tightrope
blindfolded,” the Mintz court describes secondary
considerations as “powerful tools” that “help
inoculate the obviousness analysis against
hindsight,” and which “help [the court] turn back
the clock and place the claims in the context
that led to their invention.”81 In its remand, the
court ironically added: “In light of the following
section . . . [finding no infringement], this court
leaves to the district court to decide whether any
further proceedings are necessary.”82 The claimdispositive finding of non-infringement did not
deter the panel from taking advantage of the
opportunity to make clear that objective indicia are
highly probative of nonobviousness.
In re Cyclobenzaprine83 also envisioned a
more persuasive role for secondary considerations.
The intellectual thrust of Cyclobenzaprine,
however, is telling. The court painstakingly
76. See, e.g., Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372,
1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (expounding at length the value of
objective indicia as a safeguard against hind-sight bias).
77. See Chisum, supra note 9.
78. See, e.g., Mintz, 679 F.3d 1372 (expounding at length the
value of objective indicia as a safeguard against hind-sight bias);
In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1083-84 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(holding secondary considerations “support a nonobviousness
finding”); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
655 F.3d 1364, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (indicating secondary
considerations are probative); Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Techs.
Corp., 603 F.3d 1325, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding secondary
considerations persuasive).
79. 679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
80. Id. at 1378-80.
81. Id. at 1378-79.
82. Id. at 1380.
83. 676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See discussion supra Part
I.G.
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reasserts the long-standing rules regarding the
applicable burdens of proof, production, and
persuasion, as well as the standard of proof.84
While a passing reading suggests the court
is concerned about lower courts’ failures to
consider objective indicia, a more careful analysis
suggests the court is trying to correct inconsistent
applications of the standards in the context of the
nexus requirement. This is so because the nexus
requirement has become the instrument of choice
for judicial analyses that undermine the probative
value of secondary considerations. While
courts have (and continue to) summarily dismiss
objective indicia as “insufficient” to rebut a
“strong” prima facie obviousness case, more often
they find the link between the proffered evidence
of secondary considerations and the patent subject
is either nonexistent, tenuous, or uncertain and,
thus, evidence of the secondary considerations can
be steeply discounted.
As the Federal Circuit works out the
probative weight of objective indicia in the face
of Supreme Court silence, the linchpin often
lies in the nexus requirement. The contrasting
approaches to the nexus requirement result in
decidedly different appraisals of the probity of
objective indicia. Thus, marked conflict in the
Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the burdens of
proof, persuasion, and production, alongside (at
best) opaque distinctions between the various
nexus tests, perpetuates contrasting appraisals of
secondary considerations.
B.

The Nexus Requirement

Unlike the first three Graham factors,
secondary considerations are circumstantial
evidence and shed light on the inquiry through
inferences that can be drawn from the underlying
facts. Thus, commercial success (the most
common secondary consideration) allows us to
infer that the invention is nonobvious because,
were it obvious, someone else would have
invented it to capture the economic benefit.
However, commentators have noted that
commercial success may derive from several
factors such as a aggressive marketing, ritzy
advertising, dominant market position, etc.85 From
84. In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1075-80.
85. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev.
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a logical standpoint, four conditions are necessary
for the inference to hold true: (1) the commercial
success was due to the patented invention; (2)
the inventor knew the likelihood of commercial
success before reaching the invention; (3) other
prospective inventors also had this information
and sought to take advantage; and (4) the actual
inventor was first-in-time to succeed by an
appreciable time margin.86
Learned Hand likewise warned against
incautiously relying on evidence of objective
indicia.87 The nexus requirement that the Federal
Circuit has developed, however, involves an
intricate dance wherein some of the oft-conflated
burdens of production, persuasion, and proof
switch back and forth between patentee and
challenger.88
805, 860 (1988).
86. Id. at 812 (citing Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere
Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293, 331-32,
reprinted in 49 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y, 282-83 (1967)).
87. Ruben Condenser Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F.2d 266, 268
(2d Cir. 1935).
While it is always the safest course to
test a putative invention by what went before
and what came after, it is easy to be misled.
Nothing is less reliable than uncritically to
accept its welcome by the art, even though it
displaced what went before. If the machine or
composition appears shortly after some obstacle
to its creation, technical or economic, has been
removed, we should scrutinize its success
jealously; if at about the same time others begin
the same experiments in the same or nearby
fields, or if these come to fruition soon after the
patentee’s, the same is true. Such a race does
not indicate invention. We should ask how
old was the need; for how long could known
materials and processes have filled it; how long
others had unsuccessfully tried for an answer.
If these conditions are fulfilled, success is a
reliable touchstone.
Id.
88. The “slipperiest” term of art—burden of proof—
encompasses two separate concepts:
(1) Burden of production (indicating which party must come
forward with evidence at a given point);
(2) Burden of persuasion (indicating which party loses if the
evidence is balanced).
In addition, the concept of “standard of proof” specifies:
[The] degree of certainty by which the
fact finder must be persuaded of a factual
conclusion to find in favor of the party bearing
the burden of persuasion. In other words, the
term “standard of proof” specifies how difficult
it will be for the party bearing the burden of
persuasion to convince the jury of the facts in
its favor.
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C.

The Nexus Tango: Shifting
Burdens of Production,
Persuasion, and Proof

In Crocs, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission,89 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
long-standing rule that “[a] prima facie case of
nexus is made when the patentee shows both that
there is commercial success, and that the product
that is commercially successful is the invention
disclosed and claimed in the patent.”90 A patentee
therefore enjoys a presumption of nexus if the
commercially successful product is the patented
invention.91 Of course, “[the patentee] carries the
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 & n.4
(2011) (internal citations omitted).
89. 598 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
90. Id. at 1310-11 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,
227 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl.
Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
91. Where the subject of the patent is only a component of
the commercially successful product (i.e. not co-extensive with the
product), “the patentee must show prima facie a legally sufficient
relationship between that which is patented and that which is sold.”
Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387,
1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Traditional proof of a prima facie nexus
in the context of a patented subcomponent of a commercially
successful product includes “evidence that the patented feature
yields comparative advantages” or “evidence that the patentee and
its competitors consistently used the patented feature while varying
other features.” Chisum, supra note 9, § 5.05. Here again, however,
the law is opaque and reflects the conflict in the co-extensive
context. See Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d
1357, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that substantial evidence
supported a jury’s verdict of nonobviousness where patent owner
showed the necessary nexus by evidence that “the licensing fee for
a covered product was more than cut in half immediately upon the
expiration of the patent.”); Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202
F.3d 1340, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding a prima facie nexus
by relying on a survey that indicated “a statistically significant
percentage of customers viewed the [patented subcomponent] as
being of more value to them, and reported that the [component] was
the very reason they purchased the device . . . and was the reason
they were willing to pay more . . . than for one without it”). But
see Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d 938, 948 (N.D.
Ill. 2010) (finding it “difficult to calculate the worth of a specific
[component],” but concluding that the accused infringer’s inclusion
of the component in the product, advertising of that specific feature,
and subsequent commercial success of the product sufficed to show
the required nexus), rev’d on other grounds, 667 F.3d 1261 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Mar. 12, 2012); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (presuming a nexus where the commercially successful
merchandise “encompasses the claimed features” as well as
unclaimed features). Interestingly, in this non-coextensive context,
evidence of copying buttresses evidence of commercial success.
See Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 816 F.2d 1549, 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding patented O-ring seal—a subcomponent
of a commercially successful oil and gas well drilling bit—that
was continuously copied by competitors, while other features were

burden of demonstrating that the ‘thing . . . that is
commercially successful is the invention disclosed
and claimed in the patent.’”92
Once the presumption is established,
“the burden of coming forward with evidence
in rebuttal shifts to the challenger.”93 Thus,
the challenger may rebut the presumption by
producing evidence “attributing these secondary
considerations to causes other than the claimed
invention” sufficient to “make a convincing case
that those [other factors] indeed were the likely
cause of the success.”94 The challenger may
also attempt to prove the commercial success
flows from unclaimed features or, alternatively,
features that are readily available in prior art.95 In
the absence of such evidence, the presumption
stands.96
If the challenger comes forward with
evidence that suggests the commercial success
derived not from the merits of the patented
invention, but rather from other factors, then the
court must consider all the evidence (including
rebuttal evidence from the patentee) and determine
if the challenger has met the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard of proof in order to carry their
not, gave “rise to an inference that there is a nexus between the
patented feature and the commercial success”). But see Media
Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Commercial success . . . even if unexpected, is
not part of the ‘unexpected results’ inquiry. An unexpected result
must arise from combining prior art elements; commercial success
is a separate inquiry from unexpected results.”), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 305 (2010).
92. J.T. Eaton, 106 F.3d at 1571 (citing Demaco Corp. v. F.
Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
93. Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1311 (citing Demaco, 851 F.2d
1387).
94. Id.; see also Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227
F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Where the offered secondary consideration actually results
from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the
claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.”);
see also Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (“[A]ll the evidence was to the effect that [the invention’s]
commercial popularity was due to . . . a feature not claimed. Thus,
the jury was not entitled to draw the inference that the success of
[the device] was due to the merits of the claimed invention. Nor
could the jury, from the bare evidence of units sold and gross
receipts, draw the inference that the popularity of the [device]
was due to the merits of the invention.”); In re Vamco Mach. &
Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting
that, because success may be due entirely to improvements or
modifications made by others, commercial success must flow from
the functions and advantages disclosed or inherent in the patent
specification to be relevant).
96. Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1311.
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burden of persuasion.97 The Cyclobenzaprine
court, pointing to the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
Partnership,98 clarified that “clear and convincing
evidence”—meaning “every reasonable doubt
should be resolved against [the challenger]”99—
governs the entire validity dispute and the burden
of persuasion never leaves the challenger.100 In
sum, the challenger bears “the heavy burden”101
of proving beyond “every reasonable doubt” that
the subject of the patent did not even contribute
to the commercial success of the product.102 If
the challenger fails to win this uphill battle, the
patentee may rely on evidence of commercial
success, however probative, to support a finding of
nonobviousness.
Further complicating the footwork of the
nexus tango, patentees often elect to offer evidence
of objective indicia including evidence that a
nexus exists. After all, the patentees are seeking to
rebut any possible prima facie case of obviousness.
Additionally, trial courts often impose discovery
obligations on patentees to be the first to produce
such evidence. Moreover, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 611(a),103 patentees may also be required
to present this evidence as part of their case in
chief. Nonetheless, these realities do not alter who
bears the burden of persuasion (the challenger),
or the standard of proof (clear and convincing
evidence).104
D.

Conflict Within the Federal

97. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246
(2011) (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S.
1, 8 (1934)); see also In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1078
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2242) (applying “clear and
convincing evidence” standard of proof in the obviousness inquiry).
98. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246.
99. Id. at 2247 (quoting Mumm v. Jacob E. Decker &
Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171 (1937)).
100. See In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at 1078 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (citing i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2242) (applying “clear and
convincing evidence” standard of proof in the obviousness inquiry).
101. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246.
102. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[The challenger] had the burden of
disproving that the [subject of the patent] contributed to the success
of the invention, and its own brief undermines its argument, by
conceding the benefits of . . . [the subject of the patent].”).
103. Rule 611(a) affords wide discretion and encourages the
court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of . .
. presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective
for determining the truth; [and] (2) avoid wasting time . . . .” Fed.
R. Evid. 611(a).
104. In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1078 & n. 5 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
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		Circuit over Applying the 		
		
Standard
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has
not always been pellucid on burden shifting in
the objective indicia nexus tango. Just months
after the Crocs decision, another Federal Circuit
panel in Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram
Payment Systems, Inc.,105 took a different
tack: “[o]ur case law clearly requires that the
patentee must establish a nexus between the
evidence of commercial success and the patented
invention.”106 The MoneyGram court overturned
the lower court’s JMOL in favor of the patentee
(Western Union), which largely relied on objective
indicia.107 Despite conceding that “[the patentee]
had been transferring billions of dollars” through
its patented “formless money transfer systems,”108
the MoneyGram court found no prima facie
nexus but, rather, held that Western Union (the
patentee) “failed to present any relevant evidence
proving a nexus.”109 The court seemed to place
the burden of persuasion squarely on the patentee,
but then found the evidence lacking. Ironically,
the court conceded that Western Union introduced
testimony from an employee “explaining how
the [patented] system . . . enabled dramatic
growth of Western Union’s business.”110 But
conspicuously absent was discussion of evidence
submitted by the challenger to rebut a presumption
of nexus, suggesting the court never applied the
presumption.
The MoneyGram court cited In re
Huang,111 where the court affirmed a holding
of obviousness by the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). It is worth noting that the
patent prosecution context is different from the
litigation context; the former inquiry is about
patentability, the latter about validity.112 Moreover,
105. 626 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
106. Id. at 1372-73 (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140
(Fed. Cir. 1996); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
107. Id. at 1373-74.
108. Id. at 1372.
109. Id. at 1373.
110. Id.
111. 100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
112. The MoneyGram court seems to conflate these two
contexts, but other panels have taken a similar approach. See,
e.g., Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.2d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussed in depth infra Part II.E.); Tyco
Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 642 F.3d 1370, 137273 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Iron Grip Barbell Co., Inc. v. USA Sports, Inc.,

the prosecution-patentability context involves
different shifting burdens.113 Nonetheless, the
Huang court noted that “[commercial] success is
relevant in the obviousness context only if there
is proof that the sales were a direct result of the
unique characteristics of the claimed invention—
as opposed to other economic and commercial
factors unrelated to the quality of the patented
subject matter.”114 Once again, the court noted
that “many units . . . sold” and, because the
units were the subject of the patent, there was
no issue with respect to being coextensive.115
But the court found no prima facie nexus.116
Rather, it required “some factual evidence that
demonstrates the nexus between the sales and
the claimed invention—for example, an affidavit
from the purchaser explaining that the product
was purchased due to the claimed features.”117
This higher burden applied by the Huang court
likewise animated the MoneyGram court, rightly
or wrongly, to impose a higher burden on the
patentee.
Another recent case, Wm. Wrigley Jr.
Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC,118 illustrates
the ongoing conflict. The Wrigley case involved
a storied chewing gum maker’s patent for a
“cooling system” (a combination of menthol with
another chemical) that provides its chewing gums
with an enhanced cooling sensation. Wrigley’s
competitor, Cadbury, was concerned about losing
market share after a series of internal reports
examined Wrigley’s formula and found it superior.
Cadbury, the reports revealed, decided to copy
several aspects of the formula, including the
superior cooling system. Examining the evidence
of commercial success raised by Wrigley, the
majority agreed that Wrigley had “not established
a sufficient nexus . . . [b]ecause the evidence
does not show that the success of Wrigley’s
product was directly attributable to [the patented
combination].”119 The majority’s opinion is devoid
of discussion about the presumption of nexus, a
point the dissent criticizes.120 The dissent also
392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
113. In re Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d 1063, 1080 & n.7 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
114. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
115. See discussion supra note 91.
116. In re Huang, 100 F.3d at 139-40.
117. Id. at 140.
118. 683 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
119. Id. at 1364.
120. Id. at 1369-70 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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notes that internal Cadbury records indicated that
“[Wrigley’s] cooling technology was positively
correlated with increased overall liking and
also with flavor and cooling intensity at [five]
minutes and ten minutes”121 and also identified
the patented combination as “key drivers for
liking.”122 While the Wrigley opinion could be
read as suggesting that commercial success must
be due only to the patented invention, it seems,
rather, the court sought unequivocal evidence
showing the commercial success was specifically
and directly attributable to the patented subject.123
In other words, the evidence must demonstrate
the patented component was a but-for cause
of commercial success. Notwithstanding the
“positive correlat[ion],”124 the Wrigley majority
interpreted the list of factors cited in the internal
Cadbury reports as all being possible contributors
to commercial success, but none (including the
patented combination) as being a necessary
condition.
The Wrigley majority also suggests
the commercial success nexus is lacking
because “the evidence does not show” that the
commercial success was due to Wrigley’s patented
combination, as opposed to another similar
combination, which the majority deemed prior
art.125 To the extent the majority opinion suggests
that showing the nexus requires showing that
your product was successful and that it would
not have been successful if you used the prior art
technology, the majority could have cited (but
did not) to In re Huai-Hung Kao:126 “if it is not
established that the [subject of the patent] . . .
causes commercial success where the prior art
[ ] would not, then it will be difficult to show
121. Id. at 1369.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1363-64 (majority opinion) (“Wrigley has not
established a sufficient nexus . . . [where] Cadbury’s internal
study of Wrigley’s product showed that it differed . . . in several
ways that could have contributed to the commercial success of
Wrigley’s gum. [Thus,] the evidence does not show that the success
of Wrigley’s product was directly attributable to [the patented
combination].”)
124. Id. at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1363-64 (majority opinion).
126. 639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Although In re HuaiHung Kao is an appeal from the PTO obviousness determination
(i.e. the patent prosecution or “patentability” context), the Wrigley
majority seems to apply the precise principle. Moreover, the
Moneygram court, among others, has pointed to patent-prosecution
cases as illustrative of law in the litigation or “validity” context.
See cases cited supra note 112.
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the required nexus.”127 The Wrigley majority
concluded that prior art disclosed the effect of
combining menthol with another chemical similar
to Wrigley’s patented combination.128 This “prior
art” was the subject of an earlier Cadbury patent.
The majority therefore looked to Wrigley for
evidence of unexpected results significantly above
and beyond the known effect and for evidence
that the unexpected results drove the commercial
success.129 Here again, however, the evidence
pointed to a variety of factors (e.g., higher
sweetener levels, gum base, filler levels, etc.),
potentially only some of which may have driven
commercial success.130 In the eyes of the majority,
Wrigley failed to prove that the unexpected
difference between using Cadbury’s chemical and
using their own was a necessary condition to the
commercial success of Wrigley’s gums.
Moving through each nexus inquiry,
the Wrigley majority unmistakably requires
compelling evidence from the patentee, suggesting
the majority shifted the burden of proof to the
patentee131 and seemingly applied the “clear
and convincing evidence” standard of proof as
well. Thus, much like the MoneyGram court, the
Wrigley majority portrays the shifting burdens of
proof vis-à-vis the commercial success nexus as
an uncomplicated two-step (first the challenger,
then the patentee), rather than an artful tango with
oscillating burdens.
E.

The Nexus Test(s)?

The Federal Circuit has not always made
clear distinctions between the nexus test for the
various types of objective indicia.132 Indeed,
there is significant overlap. For example, in the
context of a commercially successful product
with a patented subcomponent (i.e., the noncoextensive context), evidence of consistent
127. In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d at 1069.
128. Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1362.
129. Id. at 1363. The overlap of unexpected results and
commercial success in not unique. See discussion infra Part II.E.
130. Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1363-64.
131. The dissent (Newman, J.) accuses the majority of
improperly shifting the burden. See id. at 1367-68 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
132. But see Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck
Co., 596 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
305 (2010) (“Commercial success . . . even if unexpected, is not
part of the ‘unexpected results’ inquiry. An unexpected result must
arise from combining prior art elements; commercial success is a
separate inquiry from unexpected results . . . .”).
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copying of the patented feature, while varying
other features, gives rise to the inference that a
nexus exists between the patented subcomponent
and the commercially successful product.133
Thus, evidence of targeted copying may buttress
evidence of commercial success. While untargeted
copying (i.e., wholesale duplication) might not
give credence to evidence of commercial success
in the non-coextensive context, it is unclear
whether it would be probative of evidence of
a different secondary consideration—namely,
copying. Here, again, Wrigley is illustrative of
the distinction (or lack thereof) between the nexus
tests.
Like commercial success, evidence of
copying also requires evidence of a nexus.134
Furthermore, “[n]ot every competing product
that arguably falls within the scope of a patent
is evidence of copying. Otherwise every
infringement suit would automatically confirm
the nonobviousness of the patent.”135 The “factual
determination as to what the exact reason for the
copying was” is the heart of the copying nexus.136
Furthermore, “copying requires the replication
of a specific product . . . demonstrated either
through internal documents, direct evidence . .
. or access to, and substantial similarity to, the
patented product (as opposed to the patent).”137
In addition, evidence of failed attempts by the
accused infringer to develop the patented invention
(or an equivalent) will increase the weight given
to copying as evidence of nonobviousness,138 but
“the patentee [need not] prove that the customer
knew of and desired every attribute set out in the
patent document.”139 Finally, “the purpose of
133. Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 816 F.2d
1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding patented O-ring seal—a
subcomponent of a commercially successful oil and gas well
drilling bit—that was continuously copied by competitors, while
other features were not, gave rise to an inference that “there is a
nexus between the patented feature and the commercial success”).
See generally discussion supra note 91.
134. Ecolochem Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co. 227 F.3d 1361,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“[M]ore than the mere fact of copying by an accused
infringer is needed to make that action significant to a determination
of the obviousness issue.”)).
135. Iron Grip Barbell Co. Inc. v. USA Sports Inc., 392 F.3d
1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
136. Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1380.
137. Iron Grip, 392 F.3d at 1325 (internal citations omitted).
138. Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617,
622 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Thus, evidence of failure by others—a
distinct secondary consideration of its own—may buttress evidence
of copying.
139. Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps Inc., 850 F.2d 675,

considering copying as a secondary consideration
in the context of obviousness is not to read the law
of trade secrets into patent law.”140 As a result, the
extent of copying is relevant to the obviousness
inquiry only to the extent it (1) reveals a
substantially similar product, and (2) the reason
for the copying was related to the merits of the
claimed invention (as opposed to other reasons).
The Wrigley majority affirmed the district
court’s summary judgment against Wrigley (the
patentee) despite evidence, including a series of
internal records, indicating blatant copying by
Cadbury (the accused infringer).141 Once again,
the majority agreed with the district court that
Wrigley “had failed to establish the requisite
nexus between [the] copying and the merits
of the claimed invention.”142 In the majority’s
view, because Cadbury “sought to reformulate its
products to match Wrigley’s products, [including
not just the patented cooling system, but also
the sweeteners and their respective levels],” the
evidence of copying suggested an industry with
rampant wholesale copying, but did not infer the
cooling system was nonobvious.143
The Wrigley majority does not seem
to dispute that Cadbury sought to create a
substantially similar product—the first prong
of the copying nexus test. Rather, because
Cadbury copied several elements of the Wrigley
product, the majority suggests Cadbury’s reason
for copying—the second prong of the copying
nexus test—reflected the “accepted practices
in the industry” and not necessarily a desire to
duplicate the merits of the claimed invention.144
The majority’s concern over erroneously inferring
nonobviousness based on evidence of copying is
not new. While the Federal Circuit has observed
that evidence of “wholesale copying” combined
with “repeated failures” “could be determinative
on the issue of obviousness,”145 as early as 1985,
the Federal Circuit questioned the inferential
power of evidence of copying146 and more recently
679 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
140. Shuffle Master, Inc. v. MP Games LLC, 553 F. Supp. 2d
1202, 1230 (D. Nev. 2008).
141. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683
F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
142. Id. at 1363.
143. Id. at 1364.
144. Id.
145. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212
F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
146. The Wrigley majority’s view seems very reflective of the
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dubbed it “only equivocal evidence of nonobviousness.”147 Like most objective indicia, the
weight to be accorded lies in the strength of the
nexus. Nonetheless, the majority seems to conflate
the test of a commercial success nexus with that
of a copying nexus (assuming, of course, there is a
distinction).
While the Federal Circuit has weighed
whether widespread copying of a patented
subcomponent is evidence of a nexus between the
patented feature and the commercial success,148
it has not done so in the context of evidence of
copying, perhaps because that proposition is
logically untenable. When an industry copies
a patented subcomponent (while varying other
features), it gives rise to an inference that a
nexus between the patent subject and evidence
of commercial success exists.149 But it does not
follow that industry-wide copying of all or many
of the features (i.e., not “varying other features”)
of a product is direct evidence that the commercial
concerns expressed in Cable Electric:
Rather than supporting a conclusion of
obviousness, copying could have occurred out
of a general lack of concern for patent property,
in which case it weighs neither for nor against
the nonobviousness of a specific patent. It may
have occurred out of contempt for the specific
patent in question, only arguably demonstrating
obviousness, or for the ability or willingness of
the patentee financially or otherwise to enforce
the patent right, which would call for deeper
inquiry. Even widespread copying could weigh
toward opposite conclusions, depending on the
attitudes existing toward patent property and the
accepted practices in the industry in question. It
is simplistic to assert that copying per se should
bolster the validity of a patent.
Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), overruled en banc on other
grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip.
Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding copying was
an admission of mechanical superiority, but “not strong evidence
of nonobviousness,” notwithstanding protracted failure to design a
similar non-infringing device).
147. Geo M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l, LLC,
618 F.3d 1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Ecolochem, Inc. v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
148. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 816 F.2d
1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding patented O-ring seal—a
subcomponent of a commercially successful oil and gas well
drilling bit—that was continuously copied by competitors, while
other features were not, gave rise to an inference that “there is a
nexus between the patented feature and the commercial success”).
See generally discussion supra note 91.
149. Hughes Tool, 816 F.2d at 1556. See generally discussion
supra note 91.
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success is therefore totally unrelated to the
patented feature (i.e., a commercial success nexus
is lacking). Moreover, it does not follow that the
reasons for copying—the second prong of the
copying nexus test—did not include the merits of
the claimed invention. In fact, no Federal Circuit
panel has expressed the test for the copying nexus
in this way—until Wrigley, that is. In this sense,
Wrigley could be seen as breaking new ground or,
depending on how you look at it, perpetuating a
long-standing divide (or lack thereof) between the
nexus tests.
The Wrigley majority’s lack of distinction
between the nexus tests (e.g., for commercial
success, copying, long-felt need, etc.) could be
interpreted to mean the nexus test is functionally
equivalent for all types of objective indicia with
only minor variations, rather than a separate test
for each objective indicia. If the nexus inquiry is
but one test, the Wrigley majority’s demand for a
more direct and convincing showing150 to establish
a prima facie copying nexus in a non-coextensive
context may be apposite. On the other hand,
even if there is but one unified nexus inquiry, the
Wrigley majority’s position could be seen151 as
contravening Federal Circuit precedent152 vis-àvis the nexus requirement in the non-coextensive
context.153
In sum, the contrasting approaches to the
nexus requirement facilitate disparate appraisals
of the probative value of objective indicia. Panels
that apply the nexus presumption and hold
150. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340,
1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding a “prima facie nexus” by relying
on a survey that indicated “a statistically significant percentage
of customers viewed the [patented subcomponent] as being of
more value to them, and reported that the [component] was the
very reason they purchased the device . . . and was the reason they
were willing to pay more . . . than for one without it . . . .”). See
generally discussion supra note 91.
151. The dissent (Newman, J.) certainly accuses the majority
of “depart[ing] from the routine correct law of obviousness . . . .”
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J. dissenting).
152. Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d 938, 948
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding it “difficult to calculate the worth of a
specific [component],” but concluding that the accused infringer’s
inclusion of the component in the product, advertising of that
specific feature, and subsequent commercial success of the product
sufficed to show the required nexus), rev’d on other grounds, 667
F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g denied (Mar. 12, 2012); see also
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229
F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (presuming a nexus where the
commercially successful merchandise “encompasses the claimed
features” as well as unclaimed features). See generally discussion
supra note 91.
153. See generally supra note 91.
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challengers to the standard of proof, paying close
attention to which party bears what burden, can
easily come to a different conclusion vis-à-vis
secondary consideration than panels that do not
pay as close attention. Thus, marked conflict in
the Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the burdens
of proof, persuasion, and production alongside
opaque distinctions between the various nexus
tests, perpetuates contrasting appraisals of
secondary considerations.
III.

Conclusion

Although very recent cases hint at room
for change, that clear pattern following KSR
sees a rather “unpersuasive” role for objective
indicia. Far from routinely dispositive, secondary
considerations garner significant attention when
the initial prima facie obviousness determination
is weak, suggesting courts take a “tip the scales”
approach to objective indicia. Moreover, even
where patentees bring mountains of evidence of
objective indicia, courts have employed a rigid
interpretation of the nexus requirement to whittle
down the evidence to a proverbial molehill.
The TSM test, whether explicitly invoked (and
“flexibly” applied) or not, continues to give
shape to the judicial inquiry on nonobviousness
by outlining the process as a prima facie
obviousness determination (based on the primary
considerations) requiring a rebuttal of secondary
considerations. Given the current trends, it seems
secondary considerations are still “secondary” in
status in the wake of KSR.
The inferential probity of objective
considerations is not unassailable, and the
universally approved nexus requirement can
be an important check. But divergent strains
of conflicting case law undermine the bedrock
principle of stare decisis and are the ilk of poor
legal policy. While the Supreme Court’s decision
in i4i154 probably should have settled more
questions about the proper burdens in the patent
litigation context, it failed to unify the Federal
Circuit’s approach in the context of secondary
considerations and the nonobviousness inquiry.
As the conflicting approaches to secondary
considerations persist, the opportunity presents
itself to clarify the legal standard vis-à-vis the
nexus requirement. Wrigley is such an opportunity
154. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 (2011).

because the case highlights the conflict over
the rules governing the parties’ burdens and the
distinctions (if any) between the nexus tests;
both of which, in conjunction, obfuscate the
nexus inquiry.155 No matter whether the Supreme
Court views the proper nexus test as a burdenswitching tango or a basic two-step, resolving the
inconsistency with some finality would fulfill a
tremendously vital role of law from a public policy
standpoint.
Given the persistent conflict, it seems the
Federal Circuit bench is not of one mind on these
questions, casting doubt on the usefulness of an
en banc review. Moreover, Wrigley presents a
swath of objective indicia, affording the Supreme
Court the opportunity to finally give more
instruction as to the weight accorded to secondary
considerations and how that should factor into
a nonobviousness analysis.156 By taking that
opportunity, the Court could also ameliorate the
persisting influence of the TSM test, flexibly
applied or not, which perpetuates the suspect
notion of inherent analytical distinctions between
primary and secondary considerations, as well
as the procedurally expedient, but error-inducing
structure of the inquiry.

155. See Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1356.
156. Id.
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